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Legitimate Exercise of Parens Patriae Doctrine: 
State Power to Determine an Incompetent 
Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan ex rel. 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
of Health 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most perplexing issues ever to reach the atten-
tion of judges, legislators, and the American public is that of 
determining a person's so-called "right to die."2 In Cruzan ex 
rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the 
Supreme Court held that a state may maintain an "unqualified 
interest"3 in the preservation of life and may exercise substan-
tial power in determining an incompetent individual's right to 
die.4 This note will demonstrate that the Court's decision in 
Cruzan correctly promotes a legitimate state interest in pro-
tecting life while, at the same time, safeguarding the rights of 
an incompetent person's wishes, stated while competent, not to 
have her life prolonged by life-sustaining treatment. 
Because the decision turned on an inherently philosophical 
principle5 -when life ends and who may determine when it 
1. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
2. The first in this line of cases was In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976). For a discussion of Quinlan, see infra notes 35-
38 and accompanying text. 
3. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. 
4. Including the Cruzan case, 22 states have addressed the issue and "no na-
tional consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for this difficult and sensi-
tive problem." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor J., concurring). For a listing 
of state courts addressing the issue, see Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 
S.W.2d 408, 412 n.12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), affd sub nom. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See also In re Guard-
ianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 
(Nev. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989). 
5. As Justice Stevens suggested, an interest in preserving life may be made 
on "the basis of theological or philosophical conjecture." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2888 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also commented that the "constitutional 
significance of death is difficult to describe" and that "not much may be said with 
confidence about death unless it is said from faith." !d. at 2885. Concerning the 
individual's right to choose when he will die, Justice Stevens stated: "Many philos-
ophies and religions have, for example, long venerated the idea that there is a 'life 
167 
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may be properly terminated-the Court's five-to-four decision 
in Cruzan reflects the diverse viewpoints which may be argued 
in favor of or against an incompetent person's so-called "right 
to die." Cruzan sheds new light on this difficult issue and is 
significant because the Court relies on an unprecedented four-
teenth amendment analysis in deciding the issues. Based on 
this fourteenth amendment analysis, Cruzan gives individual 
states broad leeway to develop both substantive and procedural 
rules of law concerning an incompetent individual's right to 
die.6 
This note seeks to demonstrate that Cruzan is a correct 
decision by discussing the Court's apparent rejection of previ-
ous "right to die" decisions based on common law doctrines and 
on a federal constitutional right to privacy. Most importantly, 
the Court has implicitly promoted the doctrine of parens patri-
ae,7 thereby giving states more power to determine the con-
fmes of an incompetent individual's right to die. A state may exer-
cise this parens patriae power by affording incompetent individ-
uals a right to die based on a state constitutional right to pri-
vacy or state judicial proceedings consistent with notions of 
substantive and procedural due process of law.8 
after death,' and that the human soul endures even after the human body has 
perished. Surely Missouri would not wish to define its interest in life in a way 
antithetical to this tradition." ld. n.15; see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life 
and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988). 
6. Justice O'Connor made this evident when she stated: "Today we decide only 
that one State's practice does not violate the Constitution; the more challenging 
task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty 
interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States .... " Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 
2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
7. The term parens patriae referred to the common law power of the King to 
act as guardian for infants and others who were unable to make competent deci-
sions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). "The words 'parens patriae,' 
meaning 'father of the country,' refer to a state's sovereign power of guardianship 
over minors and other persons under disability." Wentzel v. Montgomery General 
Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 1982). 
8. After summarizing the present state of the law concerning an incompetent 
person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Court stated: 
As these cases demonstrate, the common-law doctrine of informed con-
sent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent indi-
vidual to refuse medical treatment. Beyond that, these decisions demon-
strate both similarity and diversity in their approach to decision of what 
all agree is a perplexing question with unusually strong moral and ethical 
overtones. State courts have available to them for decision a number of 
sources-state constitutions, statutes, and common law-which are not 
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II. THE Cruzan CASE 
Nancy Cruzan was rendered incompetent due to serious 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in 1983. Nearly 
nine years after the accident,9 Nancy remained in a Missouri 
State hospital in a "persistent vegetative state."10 Mter con-
cluding that Nancy's chances for recovery were virtually non-
existent, her parents asked hospital personnel to terminate 
artificial nutrition and hydration mechanisms which served to 
keep Nancy alive. Termination of the support systems would 
"cause" Nancy to die. 11 
Mter the request was denied, the Cruzans sought and re-
ceived a court order authorizing termination of their daughter's 
life support system. The basis of the state trial court's decision 
turned on Nancy's expressed intent that her life not be sus-
tained by artificial means. The trial court stated: 
Nancy's 'expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat 
serious conversation with a house-mate friend that if sick or 
injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she 
could live at least halfway normally suggests [sic] that given 
her present condition she would not wish to continue on with 
her nutrition and hydration.'12 
available to us. 
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851. 
9. Recently, Nancy's parents were allowed to have Nancy's treatment removed. 
Nancy died 12 days after nutrition and hydration mechanisms were disconnected 
from her body. See Father Wins Ruling on Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1991, 
§ A, at 16, col. 4. 
10. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845. The Court described this medical term as "a 
condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of 
significant cognitive function." ld. Dr. Fred Plum, the originator of the term, 
described it in this manner: 
"Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms 
of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat 
and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains 
reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. 
But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or of aware-
ness of the surroundings in a learned manner." 
ld. n.1 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987). 
11. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846. In times past, the natural process of dying 
prevented such difficult issues from arising. However, with the advent of new 
technology, a balance between the right of the government (acting on behalf of the 
people) in asserting an interest in the preservation of life and the rights of incom-
petent individuals must be met. 
12. !d. (quoting App. Pet. for Cert. A97-A98). 
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The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
decision-which would have allowed Nancy Cruzan's parents to 
remove the life-sustaining treatment-by rejecting the common 
law theory of substitute judgment as applied to an incompetent 
individual's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 13 
The Missouri Supreme Court also rejected the notion that 
Nancy could refuse life-sustaining treatment by exercising the 
common law doctrine of informed consenti4 on her own behalf. 
Thus, the court held that an incompetent person's right to 
removal of life sustaining treatment could only be exercised by 
meeting the proper formalities of the Missouri living will stat-
ute or by demonstrating the incompetent's previously stated 
desire by a showing of "clear, and convincing, inherently reli-
able evidence."15 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear the case. 16 
One issue before the Supreme Court in Cruzan was wheth-
er Nancy Cruzan had a federal constitutional right requiring 
the hospital to remove the life-sustaining treatmentY The 
Court held that Nancy Cruzan had no federal constitutional 
right to privacy in having the nutrition and hydration treat-
ment removed. 18 An equally important issue was whether the 
United States Constitution forbids Missouri's requirement that 
an incompetent's desire to have life-sustaining equipment re-
moved be proven by clear and convincing evidence.19 In an-
swering this question, the Court stated that "Missouri may 
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of the 
choice between life and death through the imposition of height-
13. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 424-26. For a discussion of the substitute 
judgment theory, see infra text accompanying note 26. 
14. ld. at 416-17. For a discussion of the doctrine of informed consent, see 
infra text accompanying note 25. 
15. ld. at 425. Although the court presented these two tests, it avoided giving 
any explanation as to what may constitute "inherently reliable evidence." Id. 
Plausible suggestions on how the latter test may be met are discussed infra 
section V.D.2 of this note. Although the Court stated that the Missouri living will 
statute was not at issue in the case, it relied upon the statute's clear policy in 
favor of preserving life. ld. at 420. For discussion of Missouri's living will statute, 
see infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
16. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 109 S. Ct. 
3240 (1989). 
17. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846. 
18. ld. at 2851 n.7. 
19. ld. at 2852. 
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ened evidentiary requirements."20 However, the question still 
remains: how may a state exercise this power as parens patriae 
for the incompetent individual in "right to die" cases? 
III. AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL'S "RIGHT TO DIE" 
PRIOR TO Cruzan 
Prior to Cruzan, an incompetent person's right to die was 
founded in common law,21 in state and federal constitu-
tions,22 and in state statutes.23 Arguably, only a state con-
stitutional right to privacy has supported the state's interest in 
the preservation of life while at the same time protecting the 
incompetent person's interests in "right to die" cases.24 The 
common law and the statutory "right to die," in many instanc-
es, did not adequately recognize the state's interest in the pres-
ervation of life nor the incompetent individual's choice to re-
move or retain life-sustaining treatment in "right to die" cases. 
A. The Common Law Right 
Most courts basing an incompetent person's right to die in 
the common law have done so with reference to the doctrines of 
informed consent25 and substitute judgment.26 An incompe-
20. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53. The Court supported Missouri's imposition of 
a clear and convincing standard of evidence, which also arguably promotes a 
balancing of state and individual interests, by stating that this standard of proof 
was appropriate because: 
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the 
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should 
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication." 
Id. at 2853 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). 
21. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 858 (1981); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983). 
22. For a list of representative cases, see Cruzan u. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 
417 n.12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane). 
23. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 
292 (Ill. 1989); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). 
24. For discussion of an incompetent individual's right to die under a state con-
stitutional right to privacy, see infra section V.C of this note. 
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989). In order for 
a person to give informed consent to medical treatment, it is generally recognized 
that: 
"[T]he patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the 
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tent person's right to refuse medical treatment based on the 
common law doctrine of informed consent was first recognized 
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.27 There, a se-
verely mentally-retarded resident of a state school was in need 
of chemotherapy but incapable of giving informed consent to 
receive treatment. 28 The court reasoned that since a compe-
tent individual could refuse life-sustaining treatment based on 
the doctrine of informed consent, an incompetent person could 
also exercise that same right.29 Although the right to informed 
consent was maintained in the incompetent person, the court 
recognized that the state interest in the preservation of life was 
substantial.30 However, the court failed to offer a complete 
analysis in balancing the state's interest in the preservation of 
life with the incompetent's right to have previously stated 
wishes carried forth. 
In Cruzan v. Harmon, the court expressly disavowed the 
notion that Nancy Cruzan could make an informed decision to 
refuse to have her life-sustaining treatment removed, stating 
that "it is definitionally impossible for a person to make an 
informed decision-either to consent or to refuse [medical 
treatment]-under hypothetical circumstances."31 Moreover, 
decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient 
must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed 
treatment alternatives or non treatment, along with a full understanding 
of the nature of the disease and the prognosis." 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 417 (quoting Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, 
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & Van Eys, The Physicians's Re-
sponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED., 955, 957 
(1984)). 
26. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). 
Under the substitute judgment theory, another person, such as a close family 
member is allowed to make a decision to retain or remove an incompetent's life-
sustaining treatment. The substitute judgment theory, however, creates problems 
when another individual is allowed to exercise his unilateral judgment on the 
incompetent's behalf, neglecting virtually any interest a state may have in the mat-
ter. 
27. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). Although the doctrine of informed consent as 
applied to an incompetent person's right to refuse treatment was a novel applica-
tion in Saikewicz, the doctrine is well established in cases where a person is com-
petent to exercise the right. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Shultz, Informed Choice to 
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985). 
28. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 426. 
31. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 417. It can be inferred from this 
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the court rejected the substitute judgment theory as applied to 
an incompetent's choice by stating that the theory allows "the 
decisionmaker to assume that he is an incompetent who be-
comes competent but continues to weigh the decision as though 
incompetent."32 
Recognizing that both state and individual interests may 
not be properly balanced when the common law doctrines of 
informed consent and substitute judgment are applied, the 
Cruzan Court limited the application of these doctrines by 
stating: 
The difficulty with petitioner's claim is that in a sense it begs 
the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an 
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right 
to refuse treatment or any other right. Such "right" must be 
exercised, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.33 
Thus, by limiting the informed consent and substitute judg-
ment doctrines relied on in Saikewicz and by other courts, the 
Court announced that the State of Missouri could require a 
surrogate decision-maker to demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the incompetent person would have refused 
the use of life-support systems.34 
statement that the court referred to Nancy's Cruzan's actual ability to make an in-
formed decision about the treatment she was receiving after she became incompe-
tent. The court probably reached this decision because prior statements made by 
Nancy could not provide enough evidence to show that the necessary elements of 
an informed decision were fulfilled. For a discussion of the informed consent cri-
teria, see supra text accompanying note 25. 
32. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425 n.20. For a definition of the substi-
tute judgment theory, see supra text accompanying note 26. 
33. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (emphasis added). The Court also seems to 
reject the substitute judgment standard by stating: 
If the State were required by the United States Constitution to repose a 
right of substituted judgment with anyone, the Cruzans would surely 
qualify. But we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State 
to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself. 
Close family members may have a strong feeling-a feeling not at all 
ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either-that they do 
not wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one which they 
regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading. But there is no 
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will neces-
sarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been con-
fronted with the prospect of her situation while competent. 
ld. at 2855-56. 
34. ld. Requiring a standard of clear and convincing evidence allows for the 
avoidance of inherently problematic issues arising from reliance on purely common 
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B. The Constitutional Right 
The landmark decision in In re Quinlan35 was the first 
time a court was faced with the issue of whether an incompe-
tent person in a vegetative state is entitled to the removal of a 
life support system. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
Karen Quinlan had a federal constitutional right to privacy to 
have the respirator, which kept her alive, removed. 36 Most 
courts following this decision have deviated little from its hold-
ing.37 However, the court in Quinlan also recognized that the 
right to privacy in refusing life-sustaining treatment was not 
an absolute right and must properly yield to state interests in 
some circumstances.38 As is the case in common law "right to 
die" analysis, state interests are often neglected by analyzing 
an incompetent's right to die under a federal constitutional 
right to privacy. As the court in Cruzan v. Harrrwn stated: 
In casting the balance between the patient's common law 
right to refuse treatment/constitutional right to privacy and 
the state's interest in life, we acknowledge that the great 
majority of courts allow the termination of life-sustaining 
treatment. In doing so, these courts invariably find that a 
patient's right to refuse treatment outweighs the state's inter-
est in preserving life.39 
law theories. Dependence on outdated common law theories when dealing with 
difficult social policy issues, such as the one presented in Cruzan, can only serve 
to abate the rights of the incompetent individual and of the state. In these types 
of cases, a preponderance of the evidence will simply not suffice. See, e.g., Tracy L. 
Merritt, Note, Equality {or the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 714 (1987) (arguing that the substitute judgment theory 
cannot be used to promote an incompetent's autonomy without reliable evidence of 
the incompetent's intent). 
35. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
36. 355 A.2d at 662-64. 
37. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), stating: 
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of 
the sanctity of individual free choice and self determination as fundamen-
tal constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not 
by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent 
being the right of choice. 
lei. at 426 (emphasis added); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
38. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. 
39. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 420 (emphasis added). The Missouri 
Supreme Court also stated that the root of this apparent problem is the Quinlan 
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Recognizing a need to foster development of state laws concern-
ing an incompetent's right to die-and the subsequent opportu-
nity for a state to protect its interests while at the same time 
protecting the incompetent's interests-the Cruzan Court re-
fused to base its analysis on a federal constitutional right to 
privacy.40 Although there is no federal constitutional right to 
privacy in "right to die" cases, a state remains free to extend 
such a right based on its own constitution.41 
C.The Statutory Right 
Due to the complex issues involved in deciding whether an 
incompetent person has the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, a number of states have enacted "living will" legislation 
with the intent to allow persons to expressly state whether 
they would refuse life-sustaining treatment in the event they 
become incompetent at some future time.42 Additionally, some 
decision. ld. at 421. 
40. The Court stated that "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right 
to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, 
we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of 
a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7. For a 
discussion of the liberty interest, see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. 
Perhaps the Court's rejection of the federal constitutional right to privacy as 
applied to an incompetent person's right to die stems from the legal controversies 
resulting from its expanded reading of the federal constitutional right to privacy in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Indeed, Justice Scalia stated: 
I am concerned, from the tenor of today's opinions, that we are poised to 
confuse that enterprise as successfully as we have confused the enterprise 
of legislation concerning abortion-requiring it to be conducted against a 
background of federal constitutional imperatives that are unknown be-
cause they are being newly crafted from Term to Term. That would be a 
great misfortune. 
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court "has cautioned 
against an expansive interpretation of privacy rights." Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 
580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988). The Court has also stated that "[c]ourts are most venerable 
and [come] nearest to illegitimacy when . . . [working] with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable language or design of the Constitution." 
Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)). 
41. For a discussion of this theory, see infra section V.C. 
42. Thirty-eight states and the District of Colombia have enacted "living will" 
statutes. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to 
.100 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 
20-17-101 to -203 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1785-1795 (West 
Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 
2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
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states have durable power of attorney statutes43 which ex-
pressly authorize the appointment of health care proxies to 
make medical decisions for incompetent persons.44 Still, other 
living will statutes specifically authorize an individual to desig-
nate health care proxies who may assure that the intent of the 
living will is effectuated.45 When properly followed, living will 
statutes allow an individual to forego life-sustaining treatment 
in the event the individual becomes incompetent to make such 
765.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -32-12 (Supp. 1990); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 
(Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, para. 701-710; (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -11-22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to 
.11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 40;1299.58.1 to 58.10 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 
5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (1990); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon 
1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-501 to -511 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 459.540 to 
.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 
24-7-1 to -7-10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to .4-14 (1989) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 
(West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to .650 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 
44-77-10 to -160 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1987), VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, §§ 5251-
5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Supp. 1990) WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .122.905 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 
(1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -
109 (1987). 
43. Every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has a general power of 
attorney statute. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n. 3 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 
statutes). A general power of attorney statute allows a person (principal) to confer 
authority upon another to act on behalf of the principal "notwithstanding later 
disability or incapacity of the principal at law .... " UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-501 
(1987). The power must be conferred in writing. ld. The power may be revoked 
either orally or in writing. ld. Theoretically, the general power of attorney statute 
may be used to delegate medical decisions prior to the advent of future incapacity. 
This method, however, has essentially the same pitfalls which exist with living will 
statutes. For a discussion of these problems, see infra notes 52-69 and accompany-
ing text. 
44. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 n.2 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (citing statutes). 
Durable power of attorney statutes, in this author's opinion, do not substantially 
forward the interests of the state in solving the "right to die" issue. This is be-
cause most statutes require that durable power of attorney documents comport sub-
stantially with the provisions and examples set forth in the statute. See, e.g., MISS. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-41-63 (Supp. 1990). Thus, it seems that most people would have 
to consult an attorney to draft the document, a requirement which is not practical 
for thousands of this country's citizens. Moreover, since few people know that such 
statutes exist, see Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring), it is un-
likely that they will rely on drafting such documents required in durable power of 
attorney statutes. 
45. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing statutes). 
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a decision. 
The living will is much more rigidly confined than the 
ordinary will, and correctly so, because in "right to die" cases 
the "individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 
'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of 
money.'"46 Generally speaking, traditional wills usually re-
quire that the testator be at least eighteen years of age and be 
of "sound mind,"47 and that the will be in writing and signed 
by the testator or in the testator's name by another in the 
testator's presence.48 Additionally, two other witnesses gener-
ally must sign the will. In comparison, all living will statutes 
require witnesses, but not all statutes require the witnesses to 
sign in the presence of each other.49 Also, all living will stat-
utes require that the declarant be a competent adult.50 In ad-
dition, a number of limitations are usually placed on those who 
are allowed to serve as witnesses in the creation of the living 
will. 51 These limitations are often nullified by other conflicting 
sections within the same statute. Such conflict compels the 
argument that judicial involvement is warranted in "right to 
die" cases, even where a living will is involved. 
1. Problems with current legislation 
Although an in-depth discussion of problems relating to 
living will statutes and other legislation is beyond the scope of 
this note,52 discussion of a few examples will help in showing 
that current statutes may be as problematic as common law 
theories because, in many instances, they allow for unilateral 
decision-making by family members and doctors-a decision 
process implicitly rejected in Cruzan. 53 
A common problem with all living will statutes is that they 
seem to extend to a person desiring to execute the will an abso-
lute right to have its mandates set in motion. The living will is 
46. ld. at 2853 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982). 
47. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501 (1978). 
48. ld. at § 75-2-502. 
49. Id. 
50. See Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L. 
REV. 737, 757. 
51. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. 
52. For an in depth discussion of problems encountered in living will statutes, 
see Gelfand, supra note 50, at 737. 
53. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56. 
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deceiving in this manner since "[l]iving wills were not intended 
to solve every problem associated with the dying process. Ac-
cordingly, living will statutes often contain limitations on the 
scope and significance of the authority to execute such a docu-
ment."54 The limitations are often inadequate, and, as the fol-
lowing examples will show, sole reliance on legislation in decid-
ing an incompetent person's right to die is inappropriate. 
Concerning the execution of the living will, many states 
provide that a witness to the will cannot be related to the de-
clarant.55 Neither may a witness be an attending physician,56 
a person financially responsible for a declarant's medical 
care,57 an employee of the attending physician or an employee 
of the institution where the declarant is receiving treatment, 58 
or someone who expects to inherit from the declarant.59 These 
limitations apparently are placed in living will statutes to avoid 
conflicts of interest. However, many times these limitations are 
nullified by the fact that most statutes ultimately allow a close 
family member to make the decision to remove life-sustaining 
treatment from an incompetent,60 and this decision is usually 
based heavily on the diagnosis of the attending physician.61 
54. Gelfand, supra note 50, at 783. 
55. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990) (providing that a witness cannot be 
"related to the declarant by blood or marriage"). 
56. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-105 (Supp. 1990) (providing that no 
witness may be "the attending physician or any other physician"). 
57. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (a)(4)(A) (1989) (stating witness may not 
be a person "directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care"). 
58. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1990). 
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(A)(2), (3) (1985). 
60. Allowing an incompetent person's purported wishes to be fulfilled by a close 
family member is even more dangerous, from a conflict of interest perspective, 
than allowing a relative to take part in the signing of a living will. Logically 
speaking, it makes little sense to grant family members unilateral rights to make 
a decision for an incompetent person where a family member should be allowed lit-
tle or no participation in the creation of a living will. Accordingly, the state as 
parens patriae should play a significant role in assuring that the incompetent 
person's wishes are rightfully carried forth. See infra section V of this note. 
61. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1990) providing: 
(1) The decision to remove such life support system is based on the best 
medical judgment of the attending physician; (2) the attending physician 
deems the patient to be in a terminal condition; (3) the attending physi-
cian has obtained the informed consent of the next of kin, if known, or 
legal guardian, if any, of the patient prior to removal; and (4) the attend-
ing physician has considered the patient's wishes as expressed by the 
patient directly through the next of kin, or legal guardian. 
The validity of such provisions is highly questionable after Cruzan's apparent 
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Some states which authorize the use of living wills do not 
prohibit those who might inherit and those who have other 
claims against the estate from becoming witnesses.62 This is 
very disturbing since there may be an even higher possibility 
that such a witness will not act in the incompetent's best inter-
est. As the court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. 
Bludworth63 commented: "One need not go so far back in his-
tory as Cain and Abel to recognize that the interests of various 
family members are not always synonymous or even harmoni-
ous. The newspaper is a daily reminder that murderers are 
often related to their victims."64 Thus, the need for a balanced 
approach in deciding such difficult issues as those presented in 
Cruzan becomes apparent because evidence of an incompetent's 
purported desire to have life-sustaining treatment removed 
may only exist in those who may know the declarant most 
intimately: most likely this will be the incompetent's close 
family members.65 
However, the most disturbing point regarding the living 
will and other similar legislation is that the vast majority of 
the public does not or cannot employ the use of a living will. 66 
Some people fail to plan for the need of the documents and 
others do not know that such documents exist.67 Additionally, 
some persons are born incompetent and obviously cannot exe-
cute a living will. 68 Assuming that a person will execute his 
own living will neglects the fact that relatively few people un-
derstand the confines of the will, its purposes, and its necessi-
ty. At least two states have recognized the difficulties posed in 
relying on living will statutes to solve all "right to die" issues. 
Both Maine and Texas repealed their respective living will 
rejection of the substitute judgment theory and its reliance on due process analysis 
allowing for a balancing of state and individual interests. In light of Cruzan, it 
would seem that such reliance on physician and family decisions must be subject 
to judicial review before life-sustaining treatment may be allowed. 
62. See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 758 n.77. 
63. 432 So. 2d. 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 452 So. 2d. 921 (Fla. 
1984). 
64. ld. at 618. 
65. See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 758. 
66. Justice O'Connor cites one survey in which only 15% of those surveyed uti-
lized a living will statute declaring their wishes concerning the use of life-sustain-
ing treatment in the event they become incompetent to make such decisions. 
Cruzan, llO S. Ct. at 2R57 n.l. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
67. Gelfand, supra note 50, at 787. 
68. ld. 
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statutes in 1989.69 
Despite the problems found in various living will statutes, 
what really must be balanced is the right of the declarant to 
avoid life-sustaining treatment, the state's interest in the pres-
ervation of life, and the state's interest as parens patriae in 
protecting the incompetent from others who may make a deci-
sion contrary to her true desire. 70 Such a balance may exist in 
allowing guardians to represent the state as parens patriae for 
the incompetent individual and allowing the courts, also as 
parens patriae for the incompetent, to determine whether exe-
cution of the will is in the best interest of the incompetent. 
Because Cruzan has implicitly allowed for a limitation on the 
substitute judgment theory, some living will statutes may need 
modification to create procedural processes which will more 
equally balance state and individual interests in determining 
an incompetent's right to die. Such modification would create 
an avenue by which the role of the courts, as parens patriae for 
the incompetent, may be significantly expanded.71 
2. Missouri's living will statute in the Cruzan case 
The Missouri Life Support Declarations Act 72 is similar to 
an ordinary will in respect to making a declaration. 73 The act 
permits a declarant to decide whether a "death-prolonging 
procedure" is to be maintained. 74 The declaration provides 
that if a person "should have a terminal condition," her intent 
to have life-prolonging treatment withheld may be honored. 
The "terminal condition" definition of the statute, however, is 
extremely narrow. The definition provides that a terminal con-
dition is "an incurable or irreversible condition, which in the 
opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will occur 
within a short time regardless of the application of medical 
69. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931, repealed by Laws 1989, § 0.830 
(Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, repealed by Acts 1989, 71st 
leg., ch. 678, § 13(1) (eff. Sept. 1, 1989) (Supp. 1991). 
70. The Court in Cruzan stated that "'whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against 
the relevant state interests.'" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1988)). 
71. See infra section V of this note. 
72. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
73. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
74. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 459.015 (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
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procedures."15 
The Missouri Supreme Court held that Nancy Cruzan's 
circumstances did not fall within the statutory definition of 
"terminally ill" because "[m]edical experts testified that she 
could live another thirty years."76 Therefore, it is apparent 
that the Missouri living will procedure is inapplicable in 
Cruzan because Nancy was neither dead77 nor terminally 
ill. 78 
Missouri's living will statute provides that a competent 
person may explicitly refuse in writing the "administration of 
death-prolonging procedures"79 should he at some time become 
incompetent. The incompetent's wish is narrowly confined, 
however, because the statute's definition of "death-prolonging 
procedure"80 does not include "the administration of medica-
tion or the performance of medical procedure[s] deemed neces-
sary to provide comfort care or alleviate pain nor the perfor-
mance of any procedure to provide nutrition or hydra-
tion .... "81 Nancy Cruzan's parents' request to have Nancy's 
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration removed82 clearly con-
travened this express provision in Missouri's living will statute 
and was, therefore, denied.83 Moreover, Missouri's living will 
75. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 459.010(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
76. Cruzan v. Harnwn, 760 S.W.2d at 411. 
77. !d. The court quoted language from Missouri's statutory definition of death 
as follows: 
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of death shall be determined in 
accordance with the usual and customary standards of the medical prac-
tice, provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless 
the following minimum conditions have been met: 
(1) When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained, 
there is no irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circula-
tion; or 
(2) When respiration and circulation are artificially maintained, and 
there is total and irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the 
brain stem and that such determination is made by a licensed physician. 
!d. n.3 (quoting Mo. STAT. ANN. § 194.005 (1986)). 
78. !d. at 411. 
79. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
80. !d. 
81. !d. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the statute's definition of the "death-
prolonging" procedure would seem to entirely eviscerate the statute. See Cruzan v. 
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 442 (Welliver, J., dissenting). The statute, however, can be 
read as supporting the state of Missouri's "interest in prolongation of the life of 
the individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of life itself." !d. at 419. 
82. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846. 
83. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20. 
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statute was enacted after Nancy's accident and Nancy had not 
executed a living will. 84 Accordingly, Nancy Cruzan could only 
have her life-sustaining treatment removed by a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence that she so desired while still 
competent. 
Missouri's living will statute supports the state's strong 
interest in the preservation of life. However, adherence to such 
a narrowly confined statute may work to deprive an incompe-
tent individual from having her previously stated desires car-
ried forth. One may argue that Missouri's living will statute is 
eviscerated by its definition of "death-prolonging procedure,"85 
thereby denying an incompetent person any right under the 
statute to agree to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This is 
troubling since living will statutes must balance both state and 
individual interests. 
Because Nancy Cruzan was neither technically dead nor 
terminally ill under Missouri law, the Missouri Supreme Court 
held in Cruzan v. Harmon that the state's interest under the 
Missouri living will statute was not in the "quality" of life 
which Nancy might maintain but an "unqualified" interest in 
the preservation of life.86 The Supreme Court in Cruzan 
agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court, stating that "we 
think a State may properly decline to make judgments about 
the 'quality' oflife a particular individual may enjoy, and sim-
ply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected inter-
ests of the individual."87 
With this recognition of a state's "unqualified interest in 
the preservation of life," a state is more able to properly bal-
ance its interest in the preservation of life and the incompetent 
84. !d. at 421. Some living will statutes specifically provide that persons who 
have not executed a living will may rely on living will provisions in the event they 
become incompetent. See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 787. A relative is then allowed 
to give consent for the refusal of or receiving of life sustaining-treatment. !d. A 
problem develops in such situations because in essence the statutes allow for 
authorization of oral living wills. !d. This approach was implicitly rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Cruzan. The Court stated: "It is also worth noting that most, if 
not all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining the wishes of 
parties in transactions which, while important, simply do not have the consequenc-
es that a decision to terminate a person's life does." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854. 
85. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
86. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 420. 
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individual's right to refuse or retain life-sustaining treatment 
by imposing substantive and procedural processes in "right to 
die" cases. 88 These processes are properly founded upon no-
tions of due process.89 Accordingly, even where living wills 
and similar legislation are involved, subsequent decisions in-
volving an incompetent individual's right to die should be sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny, and therefore, fit squarely within the 
parens patriae power of state courts.90 
IV. Cruzan's APPLICATION OF 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN RIGHT TO DIE CASES 
The Cruzan decision provides the first instance in which a 
court applied a fourteenth amendmene1 analysis in a "right to 
die" case. This approach is significantly different than the fed-
eral constitutional right to privacy analysis92 previously uti-
lized by state courts because it allows a state to assert an in-
terest in the preservation of life without running afoul of the 
federal right to privacy. Moreover, the state's interest in the 
preservation of life and in protecting the incompetent 
individual's rights is more properly balanced against the uni-
lateral decision process of the substitute judgment theory93-a 
balancing approach the Supreme Court used by applying its 
decision in Youngberg v. Romeo94 to the facts in Cruzan.95 
The Court in Cruzan explicitly stated that an incompetent 
person's right to die "is more properly analyzed in terms of a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."96 This "liberty inter-
est" was recently addressed by the Court in Washington v. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. See infra section V.D of this note. 
91. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
92. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. Although the United States 
Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the right is implicitly provided within the penumbras of the guar-
antees of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the Constitution. 
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's right to an abortion). 
93. The court in Cruzan v. Harmon, speaking on the substitute judgment the-
ory stated that "[i]n cases like this one, the doctrine authorizes a guardian to 
cause the death of a ward unilaterally." Cruzan v. Harmon 760 S.W.2d at 426. 
94. 4.57 U.S. 307 (1982). 
95. See infra section IV.B of this note. 
96. Cruzan, 110 S. CL at 2851 n.7. 
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Harper. 97 
A. The Harper Liberty Interest 
In Harper, the issue before the Court was whether requir-
ing a prison inmate to take anti-psychotic drugs against his 
will violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.98 The Court held that the inmate had a substantial liber-
ty interest in refusing treatment,99 but the state interests in-
volved in this case were adequate to overcome the due process 
argument. 100 Therefore, the state's procedural scheme was 
found to be an adequate and proper balance of state and in-
dividual interests. 101 
Although the Court recognized that the "logic" in Harper 
was applicable to the Cruzan case, it noted that "the dramatic 
consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would in-
form the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest 
is constitutionally permissible."102 The Court therefore recog-
nized that the overwhelming finality of a decision to withhold 
life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent is much more 
serious than sedating a prison inmate. The Court also recog-
nized that a person in Nancy Cruzan's position may not have a 
97. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). 
98. ld. at 1032. 
99. The Court stated that "[ w ]e have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty 
interest created by the State's Policy, respondent possesses a significant liberty 
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ld. at 1036 (citing Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980); 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979)). 
100. The state interests involved in Harper included a policy of forced adminis-
tration of drugs where the inmate "(1) suffers from 'mental disorder' and (2) is 
'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of serious harm' to himself, others, or their 
property." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033. Interestingly, the Court rejected respondent's 
argument that to protect his "liberty interest" "the state must find him incompe-
tent" and seek "court approval of the treatment using a 'substitute judgment' 
theory." ld. at 1039. 
101. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1040. The procedure allowed for a medical profes-
sional to decide when to medicate rather than a judge. ld. at 1042. The Court held 
that "[a] State's attempt to set a high standard for determining when involuntary 
medication with antipsychotic drugs is permitted cannot withstand challenge if 
there are no procedural safeguards to ensure that the prisoner's interests are taken 
into account. Adequate procedures exist here." ld. at 1043. Arguably, no procedural 
safeguards exist in most living will statutes or common law theories in "right to 
die" cases which will protect state interests. 
102. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. 
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"substantial liberty interest" in refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment because an incompetent person cannot make an informed 
decision to assert the "liberty interest."103 
Clearly, the Court's discussion of Harper was intended to 
show that even if Nancy Cruzan had a "liberty interest" in 
refusing life-sustaining treatment, that interest was subject to 
a proper balancing of her interest with the State of Missouri's 
interest in the preservation of life. The Court stated that "de-
termining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due 
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; "whether respondent's 
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by 
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state inter-
ests."104 
B. Youngberg's State and Individual Interest Balancing Test 
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 105 the Court held that a severely 
retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, 
had substantive rights to: "(1) safe conditions of confinement; 
(2) freedom from bodily restraints; and (3) training or 
'habilitation."'106 Using a balancing test, the Court stated that 
in "determining whether a substantive right protected under 
the Due Process clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance 'the liberty interest of the individual' and 'the demands 
of an organized society."'107 
In determining what process sufficiently protects the liber-
ty interests of an involuntarily committed person, the Court 
held that "[t]he Constitution only requires that the court make 
certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is 
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of the several 
professionally acceptable choices should have been made."108 
The Court also held that the interests of an involuntarily com-
mitted person are entitled to protection under the due process 
clause, stating that "there certainly is no reason to think judg-
103. ld. 
104. ld. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (footnote omit-
ted). 
105. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
106. ld. at 309. 
107. ld. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
108. Youngberg v. Romeo at 321 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 
178 (3rd Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). 
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es or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals 
in making such decisions."109 
Taken at face value, the above reasoning seems to have 
application in Cruzan. The Court, however, rejected 
Youngberg's application to Cruzan because the facts in 
Youngberg applied to a retarded adult's freedom from bodily 
restraint and did not pertain to decisions to administer or with-
hold medical treatment. 110 It is difficult to understand why 
the Court would take this position because a surrogate deci-
sion-maker's choice to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an 
incompetent person is based heavily on the "professional" opin-
ion of competent medical doctors. 111 Perhaps directing states 
to follow its reasoning in Youngberg would require states to 
follow the substitute judgment theory, a theory which the 
Court rejects throughout the Cruzan opinion. 112 It is likely, 
however, that the court only wished to buttress its due process 
analysis by showing that "right to die" decisions may properly 
be subjected to procedural and substantive processes which 
allow for a proper balancing of state and individual interests. 
Despite the Court's rejection of Youngberg's application in 
Cruzan, the analytical procedures set forth in Youngberg are a 
valuable tool which may be exercised by state courts as parens 
patriae for incompetent individuals in "right to die" cases. 
V. Parens Patriae: EFFECT OF Cruzan ON STATE POWER 
TO LEGISLATE AND OVERSEE AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL'S 
"RIGHT TO DIE" 
Mter Cruzan, states extending a right to die to their citi-
zens based on a federal constitutional right to privacy113 must 
reexamine the current status of this "right" and rely more 
heavily on state constitutions, statutes, or judicial proceedings 
implicitly and explicitly supported by the Cruzan Court. 
109. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322-23. The Court further reasoned that 
this standard of proof would not place undue burden on the states to justify use of 
restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. !d. at 322. 
llO. Cruzan, llO S. Ct. at 2857. 
111. See generally Linda F. Gould, Right to Die Le!{tslation: The Effect on 
Physicians' Liability, 39 MERCER 1. REV. 517 (1988); Allen E. Buchanan, The 
Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386 (1981). 
112. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2855-56. 
ll3. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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A. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae. 
The doctrine of parens patriae was established in the 
courts of England and adopted into the United States's legal 
system 114 as courts found it necessary to exercise their inher-
ent powers of equity. 115 The parens patriae power has also 
been found to exist by reference to state constitutions. 116 
Some courts have, however, refused to invoke the parens patri-
ae doctrine in· the absence of an explicit statutory mandate to 
do so. 117 Whether founded in inherent equitable powers, state 
constitutions, or statutes, the doctrine of parens patriae forms a 
solid basis upon which courts may help in mediating the polar 
spectrum which now exists between a state's interest in 
preservation of life and an incompetent individual's rights in 
"right to die" cases. 
B. Cruzan's Approval of the Parens Patriae Doctrine 
The majority in Cruzan did not explicitly rely on the doc-
trine of parens patriae in reaching its decision, yet, the dissent 
argued heavily that the Court's majority opinion allowed an 
over-expansive acceptance of the doctrine. 118 AI though the 
Court examined the various methods a state may rely upon in 
considering cases such as Cruzan, the Court recognized that it 
could not rely on any of those means119 and instead rested its 
decision on a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest" analy-
sis.120 Cruzan's fourteenth amendment analysis provides a 
solid analytical framework upon which states may develop 
procedural and substantive safeguards in "right to die" cases. 
In rejecting some of the methods used by state courts to 




See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Md. 
116. See id. at 1249 (citing Matter of Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 
(Wash. 1980) (en bane)). See also N.Y. CoNST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and 
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by 
such of its subdivisions and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature 
may from time to time determine."). 
117. See, e.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub 
nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
118. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
119. !d. at 2851. 
120. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
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strengthened the ability of states to assert an interest in the 
preservation of life while at the same time protecting an incom-
petent patient's desire to have life-sustaining treatment re-
moved based on the doctrine of parens patriae. Cruzan appears 
to lessen the restrictions on state action in "right to die" cases 
by eliminating prior notions that the incompetent's right to die 
is grounded in a constitutional right to privacy or in the com-
mon law rights of informed consent or substitute judgment. 
Precedent was partially the reason that prior courts adhered to 
doctrines established in common and federal constitutional 
law.121 Without the "penumbral" cloak122 of the federal con-
stitutional right to privacy hindering their analysis, the courts 
may exercise greater liberty in protecting the rights and inter-
ests of persons such as Nancy Cruzan123 while at the same 
time protecting appropriate state interests. 
In the Cruzan case, the Court stated that Nancy Cruzan 
was not afforded the same constitutional protection a compe-
tent person is afforded.124 In such instances, a State's interest 
seems to go beyond the traditional state interests usually as-
serted in "right to die" cases125-interests which have created 
a paradigm which courts have consistently relied upon in com-
121. Most courts have relied on the Quinlan/Saikewicz dichotomy in deciding 
"right to die" cases. Courts which have "wrestled" with such a difficult issue should 
be granted due recognition. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 428 (Blackmar, J., 
dissenting). 
122. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
123. "[T]he more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safe-
guarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the 
States .... " Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
124. The Court stated: 
Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our cases, the 
forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of 
artificially-delivered food and water essential to life, would implicate a 
competent person's liberty interest. Although we think the logic of the 
cases discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic 
consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the in-
quiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally 
permissible. But for purposes of this case, we assume that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 
Id. at 2852 (emphasis added). 
125. These interests are: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the in-
terests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Superintendent of Belchertown 
State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d. 417, 425 (Mass. 1977). 
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mon law and federal constitutional "right to die" decisions. 
Since the State of Missouri may not be required to defer to the 
surrogate decision of Nancy's parents126 and may also require 
clear and convincing evidence127 of her intent to have her life 
prolonged, the state may invoke the doctrine of parens patriae 
to protect both Nancy's and its own interests. Indeed, the state, 
"acting in its role as parens patriae, has the right and the duty 
to protect its weaker members" of society. 128 
C. State Constitutional Right to Privacy in "Right to Die" 
Cases 
A state is not precluded from determining that its own 
constitution provides an incompetent person with a right to 
privacy in refusing life-sustaining treatment. This proposition 
follows from the generally accepted notion that the United 
States Constitution is only a minimum standard of protection 
for citizen rights. 129 Accordingly, a state is free to offer its cit-
izens protection above that provided by the United States Con-
stitution.130 For example, the California Constitution explicit-
126. The Court stated that "[a]ll of the reasons previously discussed for allowing 
Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes lead us to 
conclude that the state may choose to defer only to those wishes, rather than 
confide the decision to close family members." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856. 
127. The Court's discussion of the clear and convincing standard of evidence cen-
tered on the idea that the standard reflected the "importance of a particular 
adjudication" and served as "'a societal judgment about how the risk of error 
should be distributed between the litigants.'" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854 (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). Most importantly though, the Court 
focused on the idea that: 
!d. 
An erroneous decision not to terminate [life] results in a maintenance of 
the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as ad-
vancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding 
the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death 
of the patient despite the administration of life sustaining treatment, at 
least create the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be cor-
rected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction. 
128. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see also In re 
C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981). 
129. Mills v. Rogers 457 U.S. 291 (1982). There, the Court stated that "(f1or 
purposes of determining actual rights and obligations, however, questions of state 
law cannot be avoided. Within our federal system the substantive rights provided 
by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may recognize lib-
erty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal 
Constitution." Id. at 300 (citations omitted). 
130. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection 
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ly provides for the right to privacy, stating that "[a]ll people are 
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."131 States are free, 
therefore, to extend a state constitutional right to privacy to 
their citizens. Florida has recently extended such a right by 
constitutional amendment. 132 Further, the Florida Supreme 
Court recently held that the Florida Constitution allows an 
incompetent individual the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment based on a state constitutional right to privacy. 133 
Seemingly, extending the state constitutional right of pri-
vacy is the preferred solution to protecting the rights of both 
the incompetent individual and the state. 134 If such a right is 
not created/35 however, it becomes the right of the state as 
parens patriae to protect the rights of incompetent individuals 
such as Nancy Cruzan. This conclusion stems from Cruzan's 
apparent rejection of the notion that the common law doctrine 
of informed consent may be applied in cases involving an in-
competent person's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Brennan, The Bill of Rights 
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual 
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986). 
131. CAL. CONS"!'. art. I, § 1; see also HAW. CoNST. art. 1, § 6 ("The right of the 
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a 
compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement 
this right."). 
132. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (1991) ("Every natural person has the right to 
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life . . . ."). 
133. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). Some courts, 
however, have rejected the notion that an incompetent person has a state con-
stitutional right to privacy in declining life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., McKay 
v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). 
134. Justice Scalia stated that the right to make such a public policy decision 
"is up to the citizens of . . . [the state] to decide through their elected representa-
tives." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). A state constitution may 
be amended by state legislatures who, through the political process, are chosen by 
citizens of the state. C{. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
135. It may be argued that even in the existence of a state constitutional right 
to privacy, a court must still exercise its parens patriae power to resolve disputes 
which may arise concerning an incompetent person's previously purported desire to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Such a contest should be guided by procedures 
which reflect the seriousness of the ultimate outcome, in this instance usually a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence. 
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ment. 136 
The wisdom of applying common law doctrines to cases 
involving an incompetent person's right to die subsides in light 
of Cruzan. 137 Additionally, present living will statutes do not 
provide an adequate means of protecting the sometimes unas-
certainable wishes of an incompetent person's desire to receive 
or refuse life-sustaining treatment. 138 In light of these cir-
cumstances, 139 it is questionable whether a state would be re-
quired to defer to a surrogate's decision to terminate an 
incompetent's life-sustaining treatment when competent and 
probative evidence establishes the incompetent's intent. 140 
Therefore, the doctrine of parens patriae, as exercised by the 
judicial branch, may be a better means of effectuating an 
incompetent's right to die. 
D. Courts and Guardians: Keepers of the State's Parens Patri-
ae Power 
Decisions to forego life-prolonging procedures may be held 
m the hands of guardians141 or the courts142 as parens pa-
136. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. 
137. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text. 
139. In view of the apparent problems with common law doctrines and living 
will statutes, an initial strong presumption in favor of a state's interest in promot-
ing life may be properly asserted. Concerning such a presumption, the Court in 
Cruzan stated: 
In the context presented here, a State has more particular interests 
at stake. The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision 
of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimate-
ly seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the im-
position of heightened evidentiary requirements. 
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852; see also infra notes 154 & 160 and accompanying text. 
140. The Cruzan Court explicitly reserved the question by stating: 
We are not faced in this case with the question of whether a State 
might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if competent and 
probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a 
desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for 
her by that individual. 
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 n.12. It will prove difficult to prove an incompetent 
person's desire without the aid of formal procedures such as the "living will" since 
most persons do not contemplate ever being in a position of incompetency. Sei id. 
(citing 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDI-
CINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS 241-42 (1982)). Adequate procedural and substantive safeguards may better, 
although not perfectly, aid in such situations. 
141. See, e.g., In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
192 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
triae acting on behalf of the state. Indeed, the seminal case of 
In re Quinlan,143 upon which most subsequent cases have re-
lied, held that .the judicial authority to order discontinuation of 
life-sustaining treatment could be found in the parens patriae 
power of the state.144 The Court in Cruzan explicitly provided 
that states may create procedural methods to deal with an 
incompetent's right to die. 145 Accordingly, the state court may 
act as parens patriae on behalf of the incompetent, reviewing 
the facts of each individual case to assure that the rights of the 
incompetent are protected. By analogy to petitions to sterilize 
incompetent individuals, 146 a proper procedural framework 
may be created by state legislatures or by state courts. 
The Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon stated 
that "[a] guardian's power to exercise third party choice arises 
from the state's authority, not the constitutional rights of the 
ward. The guardian is the delegatee of the state's parens patri-
ae power."147 Accordingly, guardians represent both the state 
and the incompetent individual as parens patriae for the incom-
petent individual and as delegatee of the state's parens patriae 
power. 
("court-appointed 'guardian', . . . being an officer of the court, is always under the 
court's control and is subject to its directions as to the person of the ward"). 
142. See, e.g., In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (Mass. 1982) ("prior judicial 
approval is required before a guardian may consent to administering or withhold-
ing . . . extraordinary . . . treatment"). 
143. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
144. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). 
145. The Cruzan Court stated that "a State is entitled to consider that a judicial 
proceeding to make a determination regarding an incompetent's wishes may very 
well not be an adversarial one, with the added guarantee of accurate factfinding 
that the adversary process brings with it." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2841. In this 
sense, a judicial proceeding is much like an administrative proceeding. The doctrine 
of parens patriae has been criticized on the basis that it affords little judicial 
scrutiny of administrative decisions. See Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for 
the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975). Theoretically, 
when a court is allowed to apply a clear and convincing standard of evidence in a 
proceeding like that in Cruzan, the court is acting as parens patriae for the 
individual. This is because the court is also seeking to act in the best interest of 
the incompetent person, not the best interest of the state. Additionally, there are 
adequate safeguards for administrative proceedings found in all state constitutions. 
See, e.g., Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 68 Ill. 2d 361, 369 N.E.2d. 875 
(1977) (unconstitutional delegation of power). 
146. See infra section V.D.l. 
147. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425 (citing In re Link, 713 S.W.2d 487, 
493 (Mo. 1986) (en bane)). 
167] PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE 193 
1. Procedural guidelines 
The doctrine of parens patriae has traditionally been limit-
ed to protecting minors and incompetents148 where they are 
not normally afforded constitutional protection. 149 For purpos-
es of analysis, this subsection will focus on decisions which 
have allowed the use of the parens patriae doctrine in deciding 
whether an incompetent individual may be sterilized based on 
the requests of guardians. This note argues that the same prin-
ciples relied upon in those cases may be properly applied in 
cases such as Cruzan. 
The doctrine of parens patriae has often been applied to 
cases where a guardian has petitioned for the sterilization of 
an incompetent ward150 and where a state has had an inter-
est in promoting and preserving the welfare of the incompetent 
person. 151 Likewise, it may be argued that a state has an inter-
est, as parens patriae, in promoting the rights of incompetent 
individuals in "right to die" cases. In In re C.D.M.,152 a steril-
ization request case, the Alaska Supreme Court established 
procedural guidelines which could, by analogy, provide the 
context upon which a state may further its own interests and 
those of the incompetent individual in "right to die" cases. 
In re C.D.M. involved a case where the parents of a nine-
teen-year-old mildly retarded child suffering from Down's Syn-
drome requested that their child be sterilized. The Alaska Su-
preme Court held that under its parens patriae authority, 
148. The parens patriae doctrine has, however, recently been extended to allow 
"any attorney general of a state" to seek redress for antitrust violations "on behalf 
of natural citizens residing" in the state. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 110 S. 
Ct. 2807, 1818 (1990). Accordingly, a state, as parens patriae, has a right to sue to 
prevent harm to its "quasi-sovereign" interests. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). 
149. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); John A. Siliciano, 
Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and 
Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1218 (1977). 
150. See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Colo. 1990) ("No Colorado 
statute authorizes district courts to act on petitions for sterilizations ... , howev-
er, . . . district courts have jurisdiction to act on petitions for sterilization of in-
competent persons under the courts' parens patriae authority."); In re Moe, 432 
N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); In re Guard-
ianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980). 
151. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
152. 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981). 
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courts had jurisdiction to deal with such petitions. 153 Addi-
tionally, the court set forth the following minimum standards 
which state courts must follow in granting petitions for steril-
ization: 
(1) Those advocating sterilization bear the heavy burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is 
in the best interests of the incompetent; 
(2) The incompetent must be afforded a full judicial hearing 
at which medical testimony is presented and the incompetent 
through a guardian ad litem, is allowed to present proof and 
cross examine witnesses; 
(3) The trial judge must be assured that a comprehensive 
medical, psychological, and social evaluation is made of the 
incompetent; 
(4) The trial court must determine that the individual is le-
gally incompetent to make a decision whether to be sterilized 
and that this incapacity is in all likelihood permanent; 
(8) The court must examine the motivation behind the peti-
tion.154 
This list of procedural safeguards can, by analogy, be applied to 
cases such as Cruzan, a case involving something which is 
arguably much more serious than the right of procreation. 
In several cases concerning the sterilization of incompetent 
individuals, the courts have been extremely cautious in allow-
ing guardians to exercise their power to have incompetent 
individuals sterilized.155 If such a protection may be legitimate-
ly exercised by the courts as parens patriae for an incompetent 
person, it makes no sense not to extend that court protection to 
cases where a guardian seeks to terminate the life of an incom-
petent individual. 
153. !d. at 612. 
154. !d. at 612-13. 
155. See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990) ("Because the 
seriousness of the rights and interests at stake and the irreversibility of steriliza-
tion, courts must exercise great care and caution in evaluating petitions for non-
consensual sterilization."); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982) ("We caution that because sterilization necessarily results in the permanent 
termination of the intensely personal right of procreation, the trial judge must take 
the greatest care to ensure that the incompetent's rights are jealously guarded.") 
(emphasis in original). 
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2. Substantive guidelines 
Although the Court in Cruzan provided that a state may 
assert an "unqualified interest" in life, 156 this statement only 
allows a state to avoid the "abrogation of the state's parens 
patriae power"157 in favor of the substitute judgment theory, 
which "authorizes a guardian to cause the death of a ward uni-
laterally, without interference by the state, and contrary to the 
state's vital interests in preserving life and in assuring the 
safekeeping of those who cannot care for themselves."158 
When faced with the actual decision of whether to allow a 
guardian to permit removal of life-sustaining treatment, a 
court must use substantive guidelines to reach such a decision. 
An example of these guidelines was set forth in In re Beth 
Israel Medical Center. 159 In Beth Israel, the court began its 
analysis, stating: 
Since an incompetent patient cannot choose for himself, 
the presumption should initially be that he would choose life 
and favor any procedure which sustains, prolongs or enhances 
life, and this presumption should prevail unless it be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence that the burdens of 
continued life for this patient markedly outweigh the benefits 
that furthering life would bring. "Clear and convincing'' proof 
is a more appropriate standard than "preponderance of evi-
dence" to determine the patient's ''best interests", when the 
decision will so directly affect the length of time the patient 
will continue to live. Secondly, no procedure should be with-
held if to do so would conflict with any prior contrary wishes 
of the patient, or would be inconsistent with his character or 
beliefs. Further, no life-shortening course of action should be 
contemplated unless the patient is, at the very least, suffering 
from severe and permanent mental and physical debilitation 
and with a very limited natural life expectancy. 160 
The court then set forth its substantive criteria to determine 
when burdens outweigh the benefits of continuing life-sustain-
ing treatment. The factors include: 
156. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. 
157. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 426. 
158. ld. (emphasis added). 
159. 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
160. ld. at 516. 
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1. the age of the patient 
2. the life expectancy with or without the procedure 
contemplated 
3. the degree of present and future pain or suffering with or 
without the procedure 
4. the extent of the patient's physical and mental disability 
and degree of helplessness 
5. statements, if any, made by the patient which directly or 
impliedly manifest his views on life prolonging measures 
6. the quality of patient's life with or without the procedure, 
i.e., the extent, if any, of pleasure, emotional enjoyment or 
intellectual satisfaction that the patient will obtain from pro-
longed life 
7. the risks to life from the procedure contemplated as well as 
its adverse side affects and degree of invasiveness 
8. religious or ethical beliefs of the patient 
9. views of those close to him 
10. views of the physician 
11. the type of care which will be required if life is prolonged 
as contrasted with what will be actually available to him 
12. whether there are any overriding State parens patriae 
interests in sustaining life (e.g. preventing suicide, integrity 
of the medical profession or protection of innocent third par-
ties, such as children)161 
Although these guidelines are not intended to be all inclusive, 
they do form a good substantive basis upon which the court, as 
parens patriae, may protect the right of an incompetent 
individual's right to die. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Cruzan has correctly sought to 
strike a balance between a state's interest in preserving life 
and protecting an incompetent individual's right to die by al-
lowing states to act as parens patriae for an incompetent indi-
vidual. In reaching this balance, the Court has apparently 
rejected the common law doctrines of informed consent and 
substitute judgment as applied to an incompetent's right to die. 
The Court was correct in allowing the states to invoke its pa-
rens patriae power in asserting an interest in an incompetent's 
right to die because it prevents unilateral decision-making by 
161. ld. at 516-17. 
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individuals who may not be acting in the best interest of the 
individual. 
Additionally, many living will statutes do not comport with 
Cruzan because they allow for unilateral substitute decision-
making without affording a state's interest proper weight. The 
Cruzan decision also rejects the notion that a federal right of 
privacy is available in "right to die" cases. As such, the states 
are now free to legislate on the issue without fear of overstep-
ping the constitutional bounds of the federal right of privacy. 
Moreover, states may turn to their own constitutions in finding 
a state constitutional right to privacy. 
Most importantly, the Court made an unprecedented move 
in applying a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest" analysis 
to an incompetent's right to die. This analysis allows states to 
develop procedural processes which can serve to properly bal-
ance both the state's and the incompetent individual's interests 
in "right to die" cases. Recognizing both interests, the Court 
has implicitly extended the doctrine of parens patriae to these 
cases. 
The doctrine of parens patriae forms a solid base upon 
which states may invoke procedural processes which are explic-
itly supported in Cruzan, procedures which will properly bal-
ance state and individual interests. Additionally, guardians act 
as delegatees of the state's parens patriae power and should 
therefore be subjected to the court's guidance in reaching a 
decision of such magnitude as found in Cruzan. 
Finally, the Cruzan decision does not give the state an 
unfettered right to intrude into the personal decision of an 
incompetent's right to die. It only provides that a state may 
initially assert an "unqualified interest" in the preservation of 
life counterbalancing the previously unchallenged right of a 
guardian to substitute his judgment on behalf of the individual. 
Once the state has asserted its interest, it must then seek to 
protect the interest of the incompetent individual. This may be 
done through the courts and guardians as parens patriae for 
the incompetent individual. Therefore, the court must use sub-
stantive guidelines to reach appropriate decisions which will 
ultimately further the interest of the incompetent individual's 
purported desire to receive or withhold life-sustaining treat-
ment. 
Carl Hernandez III 
